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I

AM pleased to respond to the request of the editors of
Pediatrics to comment on the special article entitled the
“Daubert Opinion Requires Judges to Screen Scientific
Evidence.”1 My understanding of the purpose of publishing a discussion of the implications of the Daubert
decision by knowledgeable attorneys is the hope that
their article would be helpful to pediatricians and their
attorneys if they were personally involved in a lawsuit.
The most important aspect of the special article by
Sartore and van Doren1 pertains to the implications of
the Daubert decision. They stated the following:

“Under Daubert, a court must first make a ‘preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.’ The Daubert court identified
the following factors that, although not mandated or
exclusive, might be helpful to a court’s inquiry:
1. whether the scientific knowledge either can be or has
been tested;
2. whether the ‘theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication’;
3. whether the technique has a ‘known or potential rate of
error’; and
4. whether there is ‘general acceptance’ of the scientific
technique.”

The court’s focus of the inquiry must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate.
My simplistic interpretation of the Daubert decision is
as follows: the court (judge) can reject the testimony of
an expert if the scientific methodology used by the expert witness as the basis of the expert opinion is not
accepted by the scientific community. However, the
court must accept the opinion of an expert if the methodology of the expert is acceptable even if the court may
not consider the expert’s opinion to be scientifically
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correct. If the litigants have determined that a jury trial
has been selected, then the lawsuit must proceed for a
jury verdict.2
Although the article is scholarly and interesting, the
examples provided by Sartore and van Doren1 are somewhat unrelated to the medicolegal problems with which
pediatricians and obstetricians are confronted. Some of
the examples in their article1 demonstrate how the
courts will make decisions that would be considered
scientifically tenuous. As an example, “courts have used
the concept of relative risk” when performing a Daubert
analysis of the admissibility of causation evidence.
Courts have repeatedly held that when epidemiologic
studies establish a relative-risk factor that is greater than
2, a jury can reliably conclude that the exposure caused
the injury under the preponderance-of-evidence standard. As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, “the threshold for concluding that an agent more likely than not
caused a disease is 2.0. A relative risk of 1.0 means that
the agent has no causative effect on incidence. A relative
risk of 2.0 thus implies a 50% likelihood that the agent
caused the disease. Risks greater than 2.0 permit an
inference that the plaintiff’s disease was more likely than
not caused by the agent.” On the other hand, if the
relative risk is 2.0 or less, then the background risk is at
least as likely to have caused the injury as the alleged
negligence, and legal causation cannot be found.
You have to read the whole section in the article,1 but
anyone who is aware of how relative risks are deterOpinions expressed in these commentaries are those of the author and not necessarily
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mined is aware that it is a complicated process, because
usually there have been multiple epidemiologic studies.
Determining whether the relative risk is just above or
just below 2.0 is frequently an arbitrary and contentious
issue. However, the court has to accept one version,
whereas scientists may say, “we do not have enough
information to make a valid decision.” Even with competent and nonpartisan experts on both sides, the court
will be making a decision that the scientific experts may
not be able to make “with a reasonable degree of certainty.”
THE DAUBERT DECISION
Having been a defense expert in the Daubert litigation, I
believe it is important to understand the actual lawsuit
that resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision,2–5 which
would allow physicians to better understand the significance of the decision.
The Supreme Court’s Daubert decision involved the
evaluation of expert scientific and medical testimony
provided in a product liability lawsuit involving the drug
Bendectin.2,3 Legal interpretations of the Daubert decision by plaintiff attorneys and defense attorneys reflect a
bias, as was expected, because in many written discussions concerning the implications of the Supreme
Court’s decision, each group views the decision as favorable to them.
Bendectin litigation was the prototype of nonmeritorious litigation. It was the only medication approved by
the Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of
nausea and vomiting during pregnancy. Millions of
pregnant women took Bendectin during their pregnancy, and thousands of malformed children were born
to these women, as would be expected, because the
background incidence of serious birth defects is 3%.
There were numerous cohort and case-control studies, 2
meta-analyses, and animal and in vitro studies, all of
which indicated that the clinical use of Bendectin represented no measurable increased risk for birth defects in
the exposed population.4–13 Expert witnesses for the
plaintiff have testified numerous times but have not
subjected their testimony to peer review. It is important
to understand that there is no scientific basis for testifying “with reasonable degree of medical certainty” that
Bendectin causes congenital malformations as a general
thesis or in an individual congenital-malformation lawsuit.
There are some issues that pertain to the Daubert
decision that are important to physicians and scientists.
In 1989, the US District Court for southern California
dismissed a Bendectin malformation lawsuit because the
court concluded that the expert witnesses’ conclusion
that Bendectin causes birth defects was not valid.2 The
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, California, upheld the lower court’s summary
judgment that the standard of the scientific community,

reliance on peer review, should outweigh other considerations in evaluating the admissibility of evidence.
In 1993, the Supreme Court remanded the case back
to the San Francisco appeals court with the instruction
that the judges should take a more active “gatekeeping
role” in screening courtroom science.5 Judges were to act
independently in assessing evidence, using only relevance and reliability as their guides. In other words, the
judge determines only whether the expert’s underlying
reasoning or methodology is scientifically sound, but the
judge should not focus on the conclusion of the expert
witness. On January 7, 1995, a 3-judge appeals panel
found that the plaintiff’s scientists used unacceptable
and non–peer-reviewed methodology in an effort to
demonstrate that Bendectin caused human congenital
malformations.5
I disagreed with 2 components of the Supreme
Court’s decision2: the court’s opinion of the qualifications of judges and expert witnesses. What the Supreme
court is saying is that they do not think the court has the
authority to summarily dismiss the conclusions of an
expert, but the court does have the authority to invalidate an expert witness’ testimony because the form and
methodology that is the basis of his or her conclusion
were faulty. The conclusion of the Supreme Court seems
to be a compromise so that both the plaintiffs and the
defendants gain something from this decision.
The difficulty that I see with the Supreme Court’s
decision is that it acts as if all judges are the same, both
in their qualifications and their ability to understand a
complicated issue. There are judges who are willing to
study the issues and know as much about the science at
the end of a trial as do the attorneys and the expert
witnesses, as in the Daubert courts.3–5 In the Daubert case,
the judges who dismissed the case based their decision
on the fact that they understood quite clearly that the
methodology, conclusions, and scientific basis of the
plaintiff’s experts’ opinions were wrong. Unfortunately,
there are judges who have neither the capacity to judge
the appropriateness of the methodology nor the scientific basis of an expert’s opinion. The Supreme Court’s
decision discounts this variability in the qualifications of
judges who participate in various medicolegal cases. It is
possible that the liberal guidelines sanctioned by the
Supreme Court will induce some trial judges to admit
most scientific evidence and allow the jury to make the
final decision as to its importance. It seems that the
Supreme Court is willing to eliminate experts who use
methodologies that are scientifically unacceptable. However, the Supreme Court does not want the court to
usurp the juries’ role in determining the overall merits of
the case.
With regard to the qualifications of the experts, the
court was “impressed” with the qualifications of the
plaintiff’s experts. Apparently, the court based their
opinion on the scientific training or publications of the
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plaintiff’s experts. But, scientists know there are other
important components to providing expertise to the
courts. The first is that the scientist should be an expert
and respected in the area about which he or she is
testifying. The second component is that the scientist
must avoid becoming partisan in the courtroom.14,15 His
or her ethical behavior should reflect the highest standards of the scientific community. The experts in the
Bendectin litigation either lacked knowledge of the science pertaining to the Bendectin litigation or functioned
as partisans. Their qualifications should not have been
impressive to the Supreme Court. The court did not do
their homework.

WHAT CAN SCIENTISTS AND PHYSICIANS INITIATE TO
DIMINISH THE LITIGATION EPIDEMIC?
Bendectin litigation is the epitome of nonmeritorious
litigation, and the issues involved explain in part the
epidemic of litigation brought before juries in our country. A lawsuit is filed because it may be won regardless of
whether it has merit.16–19 There are a few changes that
could reduce the negligence-litigation crisis and the excessive amount of nonmeritorious litigation in the
United States.
The first suggestion is to eliminate the contingencyfee system for attorney compensation, a system that is
practically nonexistent in the rest of the world. It is
unlikely that this suggestion is going to be adopted for a
long time in the United States, because the members of
the law profession dominate the state and federal legislatures and have an undue influence on a significant
proportion of the legislators.16,19
The second suggestion is to put a cap on the size of the
awards, especially punitive damages. This suggestion has
reduced litigation in some venues, but it will not solve
the crisis.
The third suggestion is to eliminate the concept of
plaintiff and defense expert witnesses and rely on expert
scientific panels that are “friends of the court.” I discussed this matter many years ago.17 However, I found
out that many of the plaintiff and defense attorneys
want to use the experts whom they select. Attorneys do
not want a panel of court-assigned experts
The fourth and most important suggestion is to have
the loser pay the court costs, which would dramatically
reduce the number of nonmeritorious lawsuits. It would
discourage plaintiffs from filing nonmeritorious lawsuits
and would encourage insurance companies to defend
their clients rather than settle the nonmeritorious lawsuits, which is one of the large-item costs in handling
malpractice lawsuits. The adoption of assessing the court
costs to the loser would make fundamental changes in
the number of negligence lawsuits.
As physicians and scientists we must realize and recognize that the only area of litigation over which science
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and medicine could have legitimate control is in the
performance of expert witnesses. Most nonmeritorious
cases would not proceed if the attorneys could not find a
physician or scientist who is willing to say that a nonmeritorious case has merit. Therefore, although we may
be displeased with some attorneys and blame them for
the epidemic of litigation, the fact is that unscrupulous
scientists and physicians have an important role in promoting nonmeritorious actions. Because we are not able
to modernize the legal system, our best initiative is to
drastically alter the activities of the irresponsible expert
by raising the quality of expert-witness testimony.15,18,19
We must strengthen the guidelines of universities and
professional organizations in the United States to train
and encourage scientists and physicians to perform as
scholars and monitor their contributions to the courts.
We should expect them to behave as scholars in the
courtroom, and if they do not provide competent and
scholarly testimony, they should be criticized or expelled
by their universities or their professional scientific and
medical organizations.
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THE IG NOBEL PRIZE CEREMONY
“Each winner receives an invitation to take part in the Ig Nobel Prize Ceremony, which happens at Harvard University on, or very near, the first
Thursday in October. The winners have to travel at their own expense, but
most find it is worthwhile to do so. The ceremony is held in Sanders Theatre,
Harvard’s oldest, largest, and by far most dignified meeting place. On Ig Nobel
night the place is always packed to the rafters with a sellout crowd of 1,200,
many of whom spend the entire evening wafting paper airplanes at the stage.
The people onstage wing them right back. The heart of the ceremony comes
when each of the ten new winners is announced. A winner steps through the
Sacred Curtain at Center stage, whereupon a Nobel Laureate (yes, a genuine
Nobel Laureate) shakes his or her hand and presents the Ig Nobel Prize. All
parties are visibly delighted and impressed, sometimes in mildly euphoric
shock evidenced by giggling and rictus. The Prize itself is handmade, of a new,
different design every year, and always made of exceedingly cheap materials.
Each winner also gets a certificate attesting to the fact that he or she won an
Ig. The certificate is signed by several Nobel Laureates.”
Abrahams M. The Ig Nobel Prizes 2. Penguin Group (USA) Inc; 2004
Noted by JFL, MD
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